UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. 17-CR-6-JDP

ADAM EDWARD MARANTO,

Madison, Wisconsin

March 3, 2022

10:14 a.m. Defendant.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW HELD BEFORE CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE JAMES D. PETERSON

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

Office of the United States Attorney BY: ELIZABETH ALTMAN Assistant United States Attorney 222 West Washington Avenue, Suite 700 Madison, Wisconsin 53703

For the Defendant:

Jones Law Firm

BY: WILLIAM R. JONES

P.O. Box 44188

Madison, Wisconsin 53744

ADAM EDWARD MARANTO, Defendant Also appearing:

BRAD SCHALOW, U.S. Probation Officer

(Appearing telephonically)

Jennifer L. Dobbratz, RMR, CRR, CRC U.S. District Court Federal Reporter United States District Court 120 North Henry Street, Rm. 410 Madison, Wisconsin 53703 (608) 261-5709

(Proceedings called to order at 10:14 a.m.)

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THE CLERK: Case No. 17-CR-06-JDP-1, the *United States* of America v. Adam Edward Maranto. Court is called for a judicial review.

May we have the appearances, please.

MS. ALTMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. The United States appears by Elizabeth Altman.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. JONES: Mr. Maranto is here in person and with his attorney, William Jones. Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning to both of you.

And, I'm sorry, I had a call immediately before this, so I don't know if we have the supervising officer on the phone?

OFFICER SCHALOW: We do, Your Honor. This is Brad Schalow. Good morning.

THE COURT: All right. Good morning, Mr. Schalow.

All right. So we're here on the petition for review of supervised release. I understand that we have stipulations, but maybe Ms. Altman can just sort of summarize where we are at the moment and what the government is seeking.

MS. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor. You are correct that we do have a stipulation in Document No. 10 that the defendant admits to the violations, that is, a conviction in state court for possession of child pornography. The guideline range is then 8 to 14 months. The government would, as it does often in

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cases like this, not always but often, would recommend that be served concurrent to his time in state court since it is the basis for the revocation. It's the same conduct, I guess, and he did get a very long sentence in state court and has been sitting in county jail for three years. So we think that that's the appropriate sentence as far as custody.

As far as supervised release, the defendant objects to three, I think, conditions --

MR. JONES: Two conditions.

MS. ALTMAN: Two conditions, the polygraph and the financial condition. The government believes both of those are warranted for the reasons in the revocation summaries. I can expand on that if the Court wants.

We would also ask though that he be -- a term of supervised release of life be imposed to follow his release from custody so that he remains on federal supervision for life. I believe that's what he had before, and considering that this is at least his second offense of this type, he's shown that he needs to have the federal supervision to control his behavior to the extent it can be controlled at all.

THE COURT: Okay. And so if I understand correctly then, Mr. Jones, you agree with that proposal in terms of the sentence being run concurrent, and given the length of the state court sentence, the concurrent versus consecutive is really the decisive concern here because if it runs -- even if I gave the

maximum sentence, if it were to run concurrent with state court, it would result in no net additional incarceration.

MR. JONES: Right, right. However, Ms. Altman estimated the guidelines at 8 to 14, I think. I thought it would be more accurate to say 5 to 11 as a Grade C violation, given that I believe Grade C violations are if you're convicted of something that's no more than a 20-year max.

THE COURT: The Document No. 5 has the analysis that the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class D felony in Wisconsin is 15 years, the maximum term of extended supervision is 10, for a combined total maximum penalty of 25. Therefore, the most serious alleged violation is a Grade B violation, and so is --

MR. JONES: Could you -- I was just turning to document 5. Could you identify --

THE COURT: Sure. It's kind of right in the middle of the page. The subheading over on the side is *Penalties*. It's in that second full paragraph. It says the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class D felony in Wisconsin is 15 years --

MR. JONES: Sure. I see that. So the Grade B violation. I guess my question is the assessment -- and you do do that academic assessment whether you use the maximum initial period of incarceration or the total sentence in and of itself. So we have a guideline of either 5 to 11, I think, or 8 to 14. If the Court would be inclined to go somewhere between 8 and 11,

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it would become moot, and I wouldn't object to a concurrent period of incarceration between 8 and 11. Otherwise, I would have to -- I'm only just going off of my gut understanding of how initial confinement and required extended supervision apply, and I'm under the impression that you use the maximum that could possibly be sentenced at the time of your first sentence to identify the seriousness of the offense.

THE COURT: Maybe Mr. Schalow can help us out on that.

In terms of classifying this as a Grade B or Grade C, what number do we look at, Mr. Schalow?

OFFICER SCHALOW: Yes. Your Honor, I have the guideline manual open right now, and it says a Grade B violation is any conduct constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. So it just has to meet more than one year imprisonment to be a Grade B violation.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. So --

MR. JONES: It certainly meets that.

THE COURT: Yeah, it does.

MR. JONES: Okay.

THE COURT: So it is a Grade B violation.

MR. JONES: So I guess the only question I had is why this is -- if the Court -- at one point it said -- it did two guidelines, one if it's a C or one -- is that because he had not yet been convicted in the first one? Is that --

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THE COURT: You're looking at Document No. 3?

MR. JONES: Yeah. Perhaps that's the one -- no. Yeah, yeah. That may have been why I thought that there was a question of whether it was a C or a B, and I don't see C on the subsequent so --

THE COURT: Well, I think -- Mr. Schalow can confirm this, but my understanding is that Document No. 5 came after the conviction, so all ambiguities were removed. It wasn't necessarily clear what the conviction would necessarily be at the time.

MR. JONES: Right. And I think that I now see that that was my error when I prepared the memo, so I don't think I have a good-faith argument to say it's not a Grade B violation, as the government has represented.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just pose one question. And I'm inclined to accept the idea that, given the length of the state sentence, that it would be appropriate to run this concurrent with the state sentence, the incarceration term, but let me raise the one concern or potential counter-argument, and that is that we have the state offense, and the state has taken its punishment for the state offense, but we also, in addition, have a violation of federal supervision and that there should be an additional penalty for the violation of the breach of trust of the federal supervision and there should be an incremental punishment for that.

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And I guess I'll start with Ms. Altman, because the government would be perhaps in the position to press that argument.

MS. ALTMAN: I don't mean to be flip, Your Honor, but I've made that argument to this court and the other court 20 times and have --

THE COURT: What's your win/loss record?

MS. ALTMAN: Loss, loss, loss, loss, loss. I continually lose that argument, Your Honor, and, in fact, you'll see this afternoon there's another case very similar to this where we're making the same recommendation. I know that the case this afternoon the -- it's sort of apples and oranges because it's two federal convictions, but the sentencing guideline range is less than the ten years, and so there is sort of -- he's getting an additional punishment by the distance between the two. I did not -- I don't know what his guideline range would have been had this come to federal court, had we taken the case, but I guess what the Court generally tells me when I ask for more time on that is that this is a really long sentence and that the additional nine months doesn't make a difference really one way or the other.

THE COURT: Yeah. I know in some cases I have imposed an additional term of incarceration to reflect the federal violation but I think usually not in cases where I'm dealing with a state sentence of this length so --

MS. ALTMAN: And, to be fair to the Court, that's generally what my sentences are.

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MS. ALTMAN: I'm not usually looking at 24 months and 12 months. I'm usually looking at 10 or 15 just based on the nature of the cases that I charge, and I think that's why I get turned down so often. Certainly it isn't because of my advocacy skills.

THE COURT: Of course. It couldn't possibly be that.

No, and I'm inclined to -- I'm inclined to go that way here too.

And if I just look at the circumstances -- so I've got -- how

many more years do we have in the state sentence to serve?

Three or four years now?

MR. JONES: Seven.

THE COURT: Seven more?

MR. JONES: Yeah. I'd also say that given that he got ten years for what is possession -- one count of possession, I have to believe they took into consideration in such a long sentence the fact that he was on supervision. I don't have the transcript. So it probably impacted the state court in the length of the sentence also, so it did have some collateral impact.

THE COURT: It's a factor that I consider in sentencing, so I agree. And I just look -- you know, we look down the road seven years from now, and then what are we going

to accomplish with another couple years in prison, in federal prison. So I don't feel the need to exact another period of incarceration as appropriate punishment here. So I agree that the concurrent term is appropriate.

The guidelines on revocation are so coarse -- they're not very fine-grained -- so, you know, I have my issues with the guidelines in original sentencing. I find the guidelines kind of really highly uninformative when I just -- they're just driven by, you know, Class A, B, C violations, and I just have these rough, rough measures here. In this case, I take this as a very serious violation, so it might warrant a sentence, you know, longer than 14 months, but, again, that's just -- it does become kind of academic when I have such a long state sentence.

So I will impose -- well, I'm inclined to impose -- I've got to hear from Mr. Maranto first, but I'm inclined to impose a guideline sentence and run it concurrently, so that's what we'll do. I don't find the guideline especially informative, but it doesn't make sense to stress over it when it's not really going to make any actual difference in Mr. Maranto's life. Then we're going to have a debate about the conditions, but maybe I should hear from Mr. Maranto or at least give him the chance to talk before we turn to the conditions.

I've tipped my hand very strongly about what I am inclined to do on your sentence, Mr. Maranto, but before I actually impose it, you've got the right to be heard. So you don't have

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to say anything, but I'd be eager to hear from you if you have anything to add.

THE DEFENDANT: As far as the length of the -- what you've described, it would be -- it's pretty clear that it's appropriate in this situation, and I don't contest it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very good.

All right. So in terms of the sentence, I'll impose the 14 -- I'll revoke. I think it's mandatory given the nature of the offense here. It's certainly warranted, so I will revoke. I'll impose a 14-month sentence, and I will run it concurrent to the state court sentence.

Then in terms of the conditions -- and then I don't know if we have any argument about the term of supervision. I'm inclined to reimpose the life term of supervision. I think we have a long history of violations here, and I can't -- I was more focused on the objections to the conditions. I don't know if Mr. Jones responded to the length of the supervision.

MR. JONES: I didn't. I have spoken with Mr. Maranto, and he understands it would be a bit odd to be advocating for something less than what he had -- had already been imposed, but he did want to go on record to say it just -- as someone -- I've never been on life supervision. So he is facing life supervision, and as someone on life supervision, his take is it's somewhat unproductive to not have some light at the end of the tunnel where you have the incentive to really work on it and

be successful on supervision if it's just the rest of your life facing you. I don't know what options people have to shorten that if they do well, but I don't know what good-faith argument I could make to say, well, having violated, he should have it shortened. It does cite a lot of good behavior as far as his work history and completing sex offender treatment, but we are facing revocation for similar behavior.

So he may want to speak more about whether -- as someone who is facing lifetime supervision just for -- to be heard on how he thinks that may be a positive and negative as far as his rehabilitation.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. JONES: I think I'm just kind of voicing what he'd like to be said. I don't really have a position on what a good-faith argument would be.

THE COURT: Let me ask him, and then I'll ask Mr.

Schalow about the question of early termination of a life term of supervised release, because I think you can petition for a termination of the life term just like you can petition for early termination of a term of years. Obviously, the case you would have to make would probably have to be much more compelling obviously rather than knocking off the last year of a five-year term of supervised release. That would be a different thing, but let's confirm that first.

Mr. Schalow, am I correct you can petition to terminate a

life term just as you can do a specified term?

OFFICER SCHALOW: Yes, I believe so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. So, like I said --

MR. JONES: That would be the motivation, sure.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Maranto, do you want to speak on the issue of the term of supervised release that would follow?

THE DEFENDANT: I would, and I agree with my attorney in that while, yes, I was imposed a lifetime supervised release sentence from Judge Rafeedie in California, over the period of time that I have been on supervised release, it has been more of a -- it's been just sitting in the back of my mind that there is no light at the end of the tunnel. There is no way to become rehabilitated, like you said. With knowing that you're on lifetime supervised release, there is no rehabilitation. I mean, it can't exist.

So I would -- I move the Court to, number one, inform me, as I was not aware that I could petition to get off lifetime supervised release before. I suppose that's an oversight on my part, but I'm not going to take full responsibility for that oversight. At the same time, Your Honor, I would ask you to give me some kind of light that I can see at the -- we keep using the cliche "at the end of the tunnel" -- something that I can work forward to, something that I can see tangibly instead of just an up-in-the-air thing that nobody is really going to --

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you know, "Well, I don't know. I don't know. I don't know."

Well, I know at that 20-year mark, if I can make it there -
well, if it's 20 years, Your Honor, and I go clean, I can feel

pretty strong to say, since I'll be in my 70s by then, that,

yeah, the federal government would have done their job,

absolutely, and there would be no further violation.

So I know the Court is looking for something a little bit more compelling than that but --

THE COURT: I'm always looking for something more compelling, but that's just my job so --

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of questions. I take your point, but let me observe it -- make a couple of observations, and then you can respond if you've got anything further.

So it seems to me there are kind of two issues. One is the actual fact of rehabilitation, and one is the -- whether you're being supervised. And so it's possible for you to be rehabilitated and still be supervised, and when I say "rehabilitated," what I mean is that you are able to control -- you either go through treatment and transform your sexual interests so that you're no longer sexually interested in children or that you are able to so control your sexual interest in children that it is such a small factor in your life that you no longer pose a threat of reoffense. So to me that's what

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rehabilitation is. So a person could be fully rehabilitated and still be on supervision. And so that's why I disagree with the idea that rehabilitation is impossible if you have a life of supervised release -- a life term of supervised release, because you could be rehabilitated and be on supervision.

And then the second observation is that there are all sorts of incentives that you have to succeed on supervision even if your supervision is not terminated because supervision varies. The level of scrutiny that you get varies depending on your performance. So the probation office has people that are deemed to be at low risk, and they get light supervision. The number of meetings that they have to have with their PO over the course of a year is lower. You have people on intensive supervision where they have -- they have to meet every week with their PO. So that varies. How many polygraphs, whether you get polygraphs at all, the liberty that you have in terms of where you go and what you do, all of that varies depending on your performance on supervision. So even if you were on a life term of supervised release, there are enormous incentives to perform well because you can have great freedom even while being on supervised release.

So I do see -- there's no proverbial end of the tunnel, but there's still all sorts of good things that can come from performing well on supervised release. And then it does seem to me there is that light at the end of the tunnel that you can

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petition for an early termination. And I don't want to mislead you. You know, I know I've talked with the people who supervise sex offenders, and, you know, commonly sex offenders who have crimes against minor children are deemed to be kind of a more intractable kind of risk situation than somebody who commits a property crime. So I don't want to mislead you about, you know, how eager the supervising officer is going to be to early terminate somebody who is on a life of supervised release yet --you know, which, frankly, is pretty rare, at least in this district. Now, your life term was imposed by somebody else, but when I look at this case that's in front of me here, I think this is one where I'd be inclined to impose a life term too because of the repeat offenses.

So I don't want to mislead you about how likely it is, but there is that possibility if you really perform well, and, again, in this case category, like others, the older you get, the less likely you are to offend, you know. We've had some pretty old sex offenders in this court. But, you know, I do think there are incentives for you to succeed while on supervision, and there is that possibility of early termination. So I don't quite -- I'm not quite persuaded by the idea that there's no incentives for you to do well.

So, anyway, those are my comments. I'm inviting a response if you had anything else to say.

THE DEFENDANT: I do see where you're coming from, and

I would have to agree with the second part, the second situation that you described. Yes, there are a lot of leniencies that can be given based on one's performance, and being that I agree with the second part, it doesn't really make any difference if I agree or disagree with the first part, even though I still do disagree with that.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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THE DEFENDANT: But at the same time, like I said, if I agree with the second part, the first part really doesn't make any difference.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, and I understand and appreciate your position, and I understand how dispiriting it is to have something that's defined to be a lifetime. So I understand that, and I've listened to your argument, but I do think there are lots of incentives for good performance.

It's probably appropriate then to turn to the conditions that are objected to. I'm inclined to agree with the government's position, but let's have Ms. Altman state it, and then we can debate a little bit. I think there are -- let's just start, first, with Mr. Jones' basic perspective, which is I think he's entitled to conditions that are no more restrictive than are necessary to serve the interests of justice and mostly to protect the community here is really the interest that we're looking at. So fair point. These are some pretty intrusive conditions, and so he's entitled to have a pretty solid

justification for them.

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But, Ms. Altman, why don't you tell me why should we have those -- the financial disclosure and the polygraph conditions?

MS. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

With the financial disclosure, I think that it's important for probation to be able to see, first of all, is he working, where is he working, that sort of thing, which will be -- I mean, he can report that, but that's a way to confirm that. And it's also important for them to see where is his money going. Is he sending it overseas to the Philippines to have people perform live sex shows, as an example; is he buying a cell phone; is he buying a game station, all of those things that he will certainly be limited that he can do. And it confirms any sort of self-reporting as far as what money is coming in and where it's going, and in this type of case, you don't think of that necessarily being as important as in a white-collar case, but to monitor sex offenders and the things that they can buy and the contact that they can do, it is important. Is he paying for internet when he's not supposed to have internet, all of those things.

With regard to the psychosexual evaluations, the condition simply says that it may involve the use of polygraphs. I don't think they've ever been required. Who knows what the technology is going to be in seven years. Maybe polygraphs are -- have been deemed super reliable and admissible in court. Maybe

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they've been totally disproved or replaced by something else. The probation office should have every tool available to assess the defendant's sexual desires, conduct, that sort of thing, to protect the community, particularly for this type of crime, and if a polygraph is needed, then it's a polygraph. If in seven years something has been discovered about polygraphs that make them, you know, unusable, then in seven years or eight years, you know, depending on when he gets out and how the conditions have been imposed, then maybe it's time for another conversation, but that's not a conversation for now.

THE COURT: All right. All right. I think the justification for the financial disclosure to me is compelling. I'll give Mr. Jones a chance to respond once I lay out my view of it, but bottom line is I think that the -- if it were just a matter of where he's working, I think we could probably find that out from other sources. But I do think, critically in a sex offense case, where the defendant spends his money is really a critical tool because I think there's so many violations -- cases that I've had where people buy some device that is internet-capable and it's not disclosed. It provides a good way of detecting whether the defendant is buying devices or services that are otherwise violations, so getting access to the internet, getting access to sex services online, and getting access to devices. I think it's an appropriate and useful enforcement tool to make sure that the defendant is compliant

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with the other conditions of supervision. So I'm very supportive of that one.

The polygraph, here's my view of this: I'm not going to try -- I'm not going to impose a condition now thinking about science fiction technology that we might have in ten years.

That wouldn't be warranted. So what I'm looking at is right now would a polygraph be appropriate, and it is not required that it be used, but my understanding is that it is, in fact, commonly used with offenders that are on supervision for sex offenses.

There has never been and I do not expect that an untruthful response in the polygraph is a grounds for revocation. I wouldn't accept it as a grounds for revocation, and I don't have to find the violations to, you know, beyond a reasonable doubt, but as far as I know, polygraph examinations aren't even supported as admissible even to a preponderance standard.

But that's not really how they're used or why they're used. They are used, I think, because they are -- and that's not to say they're utterly unreliable. They're reliable enough to prompt truthful disclosures of the people under supervision, and it triggers -- and it works both ways, frankly. If we get truthful -- indications of truthful response, truthfulness in response to the polygraph examination, it confirms the honesty of the client under supervision, and it can lead to their greater freedoms. If there's an indication of deception, what usually is prompted is a reinterview and often a further

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disclosure, and the indications of deception can often prompt further and closer supervision. They're really not used, and I wouldn't accept them, as a freestanding basis for a violation.

And so I have been persuaded, despite my initial skepticism about the use of polygraph examinations and their invasion -how invasive they are, that they are a useful tool of supervision, but they are not themselves a grounds for a finding of violation. And so that's why I really think that they're useful. They provide a very useful guide for the supervising officer to tailor other portions of the supervision, and they're reliable enough for that. And, again, the polygraph operators will tell you it's not a lie detector. It is not that. indicates that the person is under stress when they are responding to the questions, and that stress response is a suggestion of untruthfulness. So it never really tells you whether you're lying or not. And so the inferences that I could draw from the polygraph examination would not be enough for me to find a violation based on the polygraph examination. So that's why I'm inclined to say, yes, I think it's a useful tool.

Now, about the standards and quality of the polygraph examination, which aren't articulated here, I just don't -- I don't believe I'm required to and I don't articulate the standards for any other kind of search or testing requirement. So I do not specify in the conditions what kind of drug test has to be used. They use, in fact, different levels. So there's

field testing and then laboratory confirmation testing. The field testing is not reliable. If you had a field test for cocaine, you wouldn't prosecute just on the basis of the field test. You'd confirm it with lab testing, but the field testing is reliable enough to prompt further inquiry. So it's the same thing with the polygraph. I don't have to specify the quality of the polygraph examiner or the polygraph machine. They'll want to have one that is reliable enough for the test, and because it's sort of at the level of a field test, I think it's even more -- more to the point that I don't have to specify what quality polygraph examination is going to be used because I'm never going to use it for a freestanding violation.

So, Mr. Jones --

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MR. JONES: Okay.

THE COURT: -- a chance for your last-minute -- last-ditch rebuttal.

MR. JONES: Sure, sure. Thanks.

As it relates to the financial, I mean, I can appreciate that, sure, you could identify that someone has signed up for an internet provider by demanding his bank records. Sometimes those are automatically withdrawn or a payment online might show what's this to, you know, whatever, Spectrum? Do you have another internet provider? I get that it could be used as a tool, but the way that the condition is worded here is really unfettered demand for all financial, you know, information, and

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financial information could really stretch out to a lot that could be tenuously connected. And I just think that it's really not at all -- it's almost anything and any -- anything that has to do with financial transactions would be justified to demand. So the objection is, in part, that it's not sufficiently structured to be specifically restrictive or intrusive to address that.

So if it said any financial record, you know, based upon some sort of, you know, probable cause that he has -- "I think you're using other internet; let me see your bank account for that purpose," that would be justified, but this is a really wide-open power to the agent to say, you know -- and it's just so -- because I just want to review your financials, finances, and I don't have to tell you why or that I believe there's something there. I just want it. It's just such an impediment to people moving about in their life. Imagine if I had to come up with all -- you know, everything. You know, show me all the payments you've made to help your kid in college. You know, God. Okay. I guess I could put it all together, but that would stop me in my tracks as far as trying to just get on with what's going on, and if there's no significant basis for the belief that there's something going on, there's just nothing there.

So I just think that it's too -- I guess the counter-argument would be, yes, it could be used for that, but it could also be used just too widespreadingly, and it would

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just be -- it just obstructs the daily existence of these type of people, these people that are just trying to go it. So that would be my argument as far as the extensiveness of it, the broadness of it.

And then as it relates to the polygraph, I mean, do you have some ability to say, you know -- they specifically state polygraph for a reason here, but, you know, polygraphs also could prompt false confessions and create all sorts of problems. "Hey, it says you're not being honest about viewing child pornography. Come on. I mean, you're lying to us." So some of the people are going, well -- you know, they find themselves -- imagine the panic if you hadn't done anything wrong. "Well, maybe I watched something on -- when I was at work or something. Maybe I'm thinking of the one time I saw it." And since it's not particularly compelling science as it relates to you are lying or not, you're just under stress, well, who isn't? I mean, unless you're completely in control of your faculties, it would be very stressful to take a polygraph because you're like, "What if I fail this even though I'm telling the truth?"

So I'm not particularly championing this cause. I'm championing my client who asked me to raise those two because he has been going through, and he's saying it's just not -- it doesn't work. It doesn't do what people think it's doing. It's kind of breaking down maybe the trust between the agent and the person being supervised, and if the Court would require some

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corroboration that he's lying, why not -- you know, why not just bring that corroboration? But it may be an exercise that may be causing more damage than help, at least that's what I hear from Mr. Maranto, and I've done a few of these -- it seems there's been more and more reviews of these child porn. Maybe the Federal Defender's has just decided to send the appointments to me, but I've done a few lately. And it seems like there is kind of a bit of a broken record, and you've heard all of them, that they have this issue with the use of the polygraph, and since the only chance really to communicate about these issues are at the time that they're being imposed, I think Mr. Maranto is raising it and just wanted to express that he -- it's not as helpful as people might think in addressing knowledge. And he obviously wanted to talk a little about it, but those are the two legal arguments I'd make in response to the government's position or justification for it.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Maranto, go ahead. You can speak up for yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. As far as financial oversight, I -- to be honest with you, I have no problem with financial oversight, okay? I have no problem with, you know -- if Brad wants my records, he can have them, and, you know, he wants them monthly reports, he can have them all filled out. I have no problem with that. But he will tell you that there are times when, I mean, I'm at home, okay, and either the house is

clean -- I know the house wasn't clean three years ago, but the house is clean. There's really nothing to do, and I'm looking for something to entertain myself -- and, yeah, I'm 48, but I'm a Nintendo baby, so, you know, I grew up with that kind of thing, and it's enjoyable for me, and it keeps me off the streets. They say that, you know, the devil's hands is the hands of being idle, and it's true for the most part.

So I would ask that, while I do agree with financial oversight, if there could be not necessarily a stipulation but a suggestion saying that it is true that Mr. Maranto sometimes needs some entertainment at home, you know, instead of just the radio, and if, you know, my PO can, you know, can kind of talk about it and say, "Okay. Well, yes, you can have this, but you can't hook it up to the internet," okay, or something like that, that would be great. That would take that whole concern and just squash it and say -- then I'd say, "Okay. Go ahead and put it on there then," okay? Now --

THE COURT: Now, let's just address that one because that one -- I haven't specifically had to address the video game issue, but it is the same kind of concern that I have when I have a condition in a case like this where we say no recording devices without permission. You can't get a cell phone without a recording device on it now, and so that is one where I have clarified that, yes, I'm going to put in the condition that there be no recording devices, but it is not my intent that the

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defendant on supervision is going to be cut off from the entire modern world and can only communicate by telegram. And so that's one where, you know, we're looking down the road. I don't know what kind of cell phones are going to be available seven years from now, but it's not my intent that you be cut off from the need to communicate with the rest of the world. The same analysis would apply to the Nintendo video games, and if you can't resolve it with your supervising officer, you can always petition the Court to address it.

And so on the video game issue, I would say I'm sympathetic to this concern. I think having some entertainment would be appropriate, and so having a video game console, not a problem. Not internet capable, because video game consoles and Roku devices, all sorts of apparently — to normal civilians who know enough to hook up a Roku device but don't really know what's under the hood, it seems like an innocent device, but they can be put to illegitimate uses by people who are tech savvy. And so having reasonable controls on the video game console, that seems appropriate, but I would not say that you can't play video games. And if you have difficulty working it out with your supervising officer, bring it to the Court, and we'll kind of figure out appropriate parameters to make sure that what appears to be an innocent device is used for innocent purposes. So I'm supportive of that.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you.

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So I really don't -- while I don't really see the need for it, I don't have a big enough objection to financial oversight to compel the Court to accept that --

THE COURT: Yeah. And let me just finish up my response, because Mr. Jones raises, I think, a fair point: not treat the financial conditions like the search conditions, which is to say, the search has to be based on a reasonable suspicion? So we authorize probation officers to search the residence of the offender if there's a reasonable suspicion of search. And here's my answer to that, and that is that there have to be some searches that can be just, I would say, just prophylactic searches to make sure that there aren't illegitimate uses of funds, for example, and I think that is an appropriate way that is -- I don't think is unduly invasive to look at a person's assets and liabilities and their income and expenses to see if there is illegitimate activity going on. don't think that needs to be supported by a reasonable suspicion, partly because I don't think it's as invasive as coming and tossing your apartment looking for contraband.

And so that's why I think I wouldn't impose that restriction on the financial disclosures partly because I just don't think it's as invasive as a search of your home. I mean, after all, I have to disclose all my -- you know, where my money goes annually, and a lot of people who are in positions of public trust have to make very searching financial disclosures,

and so it's just not as searching -- not as invasive as having your house searched. So that's why I think it's appropriate to have that condition without the requirement of being probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.

Okay. So on to the polygraph then.

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. On to the polygraph. Some of these the Court may not be aware of, and I do invite the Court to do all their fact checking as much as they like. The polygraph actually started as a heart monitor machine in 1958, and it has — at one point it was noticed by law enforcement, and it wound its way into a situation in that it kind of grew. It became a breathing monitor, and it became a movement monitor, and now it's — it checks your iris, and it uses an algorithm to measure how much your eye moves during the answer to a question. But like Mr. Jones said, there is not a single time that anybody goes into a polygraph test completely confident that they're going to pass it, and the reason why is because they already know that there's some degree of inadequacy in the responses of the polygraph.

One thing when someone is looking at the polygraph argument, you really have to look at the reason for a lie. The reason someone lies is to deceit or deceive someone else without the knowledge of that someone else, okay? That's the reason for a lie. Now, one interesting fact is that no other result of anybody else's polygraph has anything to do with an individual

polygraph. Everything is different. As a matter of fact, as the very first thing that they do, they do what's called a baseline test, and this baseline test is flawed because what happens is the -- and this has happened every time that I've gone to take a polygraph. That's how I can say this.

What the polygrapher will do is they will say, "Okay.

Write a number down on this piece of paper," and you write the number down on this piece of paper. Okay. And then he takes it, and he tapes it to the wall, and he says, "Okay. Now, look at it, and now tell me did you write the number one?"

And then if you wrote the number three, you say, "Yes."

"Did you write the number two?"

"Yes."

"Did you write the number three?"

"No."

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That's how they take the baseline. There's a problem with it though. The person that you're giving the answer to already knows whether it's a lie or not, and that's where the flaw in the base test is. That happens every single time the polygraph is given.

Another fact is that over two questions, the accuracy just plummets. I mean not -- not like -- it plummets. And the way the polygraphs are given today or as they were given three years ago, while, yes, in several cases it's right and in several cases -- a broken clock is correct two times a day, okay? Now,

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I'm not saying the polygraph is worse than that. I'm not saying that. But what I am saying is that the polygraph being used as a tool only on sex offenders now -- I don't know if the Court knows about that. They do it only on sex offenders or under, you know, some kind of existential circumstance, and, yes, while I am a sex offender and while, yes, you know, there has been a violation here, Mr. Jones here not too long ago, he said that -- MR. JONES: Hang on. Can I talk to him for a second

about what we may have talked about and --

THE COURT: Sure. Yeah. Go ahead and counsel.

(Discussion held off the record between Mr. Jones and the defendant.)

MR. JONES: I just wanted to give him --

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Yeah. Mr. Jones, he made the point not too long ago that one of the issues that is with the polygraph is false confessions, and I can say this is true because I've done it. I have also been able to -- I mean, this is kind of -- I have also -- I have also been able to control what the machine outputs, not every time, not all the time, but if I really put my mind to it, I can control those faculties that are supposedly involuntary. They're not involuntary. You can train yourself to control them. You can train yourself to slow your heart rate.

You know, there's a very large website, an organization, right now. It's -- you can read all about it at

antipolygraph.org. It gives all these points and more, many more, on why the polygraph should be considered not necessarily a tool as much as a, well, novelty really. Brad will tell you that -- well, actually, no, this is when I was under Tracy. There was one polygraph that I went in, okay, and after the polygraph, the administrator, he, you know, called the supervisor, and, you know -- you know, a fire drill went off, and apparently, you know -- now, I didn't -- but that was chalked up as a fluke. Well, how many of these flukes go on, because it was -- the readings were just off the fricking chart for -- I mean, for every single question. Forgive my French.

But the point is while in some cases, in some specific testings with the polygraph, it seems to be able to detect stress response to a specific question, it may have been the question before. It may be a question that he —— that the person knows that they're going to answer in the future. It doesn't have to be that specific question. There's all kinds —— Judge, there's all kinds of problems with the polygraph, okay? And I know that you just got done saying that, yeah, well, you look at the results of the polygraph. You're not going to sit there and say, "Okay. Well, you're revoked based off of this polygraph." I know —— you just said —— you just said that. I was listening, okay? But at the same time, it's not the tool that it's, well, made out to be because —— I mean, yes, law enforcement is pro-polygraph. Yes, of course they are. But to

the other side of the entire population, well, it's a -- I kind of agree that it might -- it might inspire the parole agent to maybe sit down and ask a couple of questions afterwards to kind of clarify, but it's been my experience that when I go up -- when I've taken polygraphs and I've been truthful and it's been -- it said I was, you know, lying but I was actually telling the truth, which has happened -- I can actually count, one, two, three -- I'm now over ten, so I'm going to stop there. You know, there's always going to be a post-interview after a polygraph at the -- well, the way the Eau Claire office runs it, there's a post-interview, okay? And that -- and then -- but when you're done with the test, the administrator tells you what the results are. "You failed this question; you failed that question," okay? And your parole agent is listening all the time on one of the monitor things.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE DEFENDANT: So they already know. And so you go up there, and you talk to them, and, you know, they are making their entire discernment on your situation or performance based off of your -- the output of that machine, and it could be wrong, as I've said. And as a result, then the parolee would then be either sanctioned or it would be -- you know, have some other requirement that is not warranted because it's not true, but yet the machine -- well, the machine says, and you were asked three different times. That's part of the problem. You

were asked three different times. That's part of the problem.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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THE DEFENDANT: The more questions asked -- it doesn't matter if it's the same question one, two, three times. The more questions, the more stressful someone gets.

So, Your Honor, it is true, and I believe the state has commented that in no uncertain terms, there is no machine that can detect a lie, okay?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE DEFENDANT: There is only this machine that has no formal training for it. Every person that administers polygraphs, they do it a little differently, and they'll tell you that. It's not something that you get like a two-year degree in, or it's not something that you go to a trade school or anything like that. It's basically self-taught, and I don't think it should be -- it should be used in a situation in which the parolee could very well may be sanctioned for telling the truth, but this machine that doesn't know, you know -- that doesn't know anything but whatever the keys are, but this machine is telling me that I'm lying, but, I'm sorry, I was there, you know.

And so those instances where the machine is wrong kind of -- it instills a little anger in the person that took the test, especially when they're in front of their PO in the post-interview and they say, "Well, there was some deceit that

was measured here." And I said, "Well, how do you know it was deceit? Where is this deceit coming from?" Every single time I have been in the post-interview and we've talked about a failed question, it's always been about deceit, deceit. It's, like, stamped "deceit" just because one reading was a little higher than the other or whatever the case is. The polygrapher said that, "Well, he's lying so -- this is deceit so, therefore, he's lying," and that's what your next six months -- you're going to be dealing with this extra sanction or sanctions that you shouldn't have to because it was -- you were telling the truth.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE DEFENDANT: So I don't think it should be used as a tool as, you know, as strongly as it is. In cases that -- such as this one, okay -- this case is about child pornography. I mean, I can't -- I mean, I can be ashamed of it, but at the same time, I can't -- you know, I can't -- I can't let it, you know, bury my head in the sand and just sit there for the rest of my life. I can't do that. I have to move forward because life is moving forward, and it doesn't stop, okay? And when Brad calls me or I get a letter in the mail from somewhere in Wisconsin saying that I have to show up at Eau Claire to take a polygraph, it's not that I'm saying, "Oh. Oh, no. I've done this. I've done" -- no, no, no. It's just the stress of having to go in there and have a machine tell you whether you're lying or not and then have your PO, you know, decide the next six months

based off of that.

I mean, I'm sorry I'm getting a little -- I don't know -- animated, but at the same time, it's a -- it's a point for me. You know, it's something that I know quite a bit about because I have done quite a bit of research, and I -- as I said, I don't think it should be used as the tool it is being used as today.

THE COURT: I -- you know, I've talked with the probation office about the polygraph use, and, you know, when I got on the bench and I first started encountering it, I shared all of the concerns about the fact that it was not deemed accurate enough to be admissible in court, so why should it be used? And so I raised those concerns with the probation office, and they arranged, helpfully, a demonstration of a polygraph, and so they persuaded me of its usefulness, and I'm still persuaded of that. But, you know, this is the first time I've had a really fulsome discussion of the issue with somebody who is on the other end of the machine. So I appreciate your taking the time to lay out your concerns.

I am going to impose the condition in this case, but I will, again, reflect on the use of the polygraph. I will discuss it again with the probation office. I'm also going to have your concerns transcribed so that other people can see it so, you know, Tracy and the other officers who use it and Lori Baker, who is the chief probation officer now, can look at it. So we'll have another discussion about it.

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Some of your concerns I think I've already anticipated. Like I said, I recognize the shortcomings of it. Many of the things that you identified were discussed with the polygrapher who was there to do the demonstration, so I do recognize -- and I think the two points that I want to emphasize here is I recognize the limitations of the accuracy of a polygraph. Ι recognize it is not a lie detector, and I know that it is discussed that the responses to the polygraph are -- it doesn't say you're lying, but it does say something pretty close to it, which is the polygraph contains indicators of deception. So the difference between that and accusing you of lying is a pretty fine one, so I understand your reaction to it. But, like I said, I think that in the run of cases, I've been persuaded that it's accurate enough to be useful, but you've said many things that make me think about that.

But, also, the second point that I want to stress is not only do I recognize the shortcomings of the accuracy of it, I would never use the polygraph itself as the basis for a revocation. So it's -- you wouldn't face that sanction, but I do take your point that it can have an impact on the conditions of your supervision, not the legal conditions -- those are imposed by the Court -- but the implementation of those conditions for a period of six months or so. So I recognize that it does have -- if I say it's a useful tool, it does mean it affects your supervision, so I take your point.

As I said, I'm going to impose the condition. I think it's warranted, but I appreciate having your comments. I will give them some further consideration, and I'll take it up with the probation office. So thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

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THE COURT: All right. All right. So I think those are the only two conditions that you objected to, and so, otherwise -- let me just confirm that, that we have addressed the two objections?

MR. JONES: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So I will impose a life term of supervised release subject to the conditions that are in Document No. 5. I will read them on the record unless you waive the reading of the conditions. I can tell that you have reviewed them, but do you want me to read them on the record?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I've read them, and I've

got five years worth of experience with them, so I really don't think it's necessary.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Then I won't read them.

I will reiterate that they can be changed during your supervision. You raised a couple of points here, so if those points can't be resolved to your satisfaction, the courthouse is open to you to have the conditions re-evaluated. So you can do that. And so those are the conditions that I will impose, those

in Document No. 5. The term is life. The incarceration portion is 14 months, and it runs concurrent with your state sentence.

You've got the right to appeal my decision to revoke your supervised release if you think it was wrong, and you've got the right to appeal the sentence that I've imposed, but if you want to do that, you've got to do it within 14 days of entry of judgment, which is the document that will formally conclude our proceedings here.

If you can't afford an attorney to represent you in the appeal, you can apply for court-appointed counsel to represent you at government expense. If you can't afford the filing fee, you can apply for *in forma pauperis* status and do it without paying the filing fee. And did I say 14 days?

MR. JONES: Yes.

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THE COURT: 14 days or 14 days from any appeal filed by the government if the government were to appeal.

I think I've covered everything, but let's check. Anything else, Ms. Altman?

MS. ALTMAN: Not for me, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Judge, you said it so quickly I didn't catch how many months was the --

THE COURT: 14. 14 concurrent.

MR. JONES: I have nothing -- well, just a minute.

(Discussion held off the record between Mr. Jones and the

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defendant.)
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                MR. JONES: No, nothing else.
                THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schalow, is there anything
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       else I need to touch on?
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                OFFICER SCHALOW: Nothing else, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: Thank you, all.
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                MS. ALTMAN: Thank you.
                THE CLERK: This Honorable Court stands in recess.
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             (Proceedings concluded at 11:17 a.m.)
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I, JENNIFER L. DOBBRATZ, Certified Realtime and Merit 1 2 Reporter in and for the State of Wisconsin, certify that the 3 foregoing is a true and accurate record of the proceedings held on the 3rd day of March, 2022, before the Honorable 4 5 James D. Peterson, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western 6 District of Wisconsin, in my presence and reduced to writing in 7 accordance with my stenographic notes made at said time and 8 place. 9 Dated this 10th day of March, 2022. 10 11 12 1.3 14 15 _/s/ Jennifer L. Dobbratz_ 16 Jennifer L. Dobbratz, RMR, CRR, CRC Federal Court Reporter 17 18 19 20 21 22 2.3 24 The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or direction of the certifying reporter. 25